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Abstract. Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or
lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and
rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers 4 systems of illative
combinatory logic that are sound for first-order propositional and predicate cal-
culus. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done
in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations
become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not trans-
lated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. In a preceding
paper, Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, 1993, we proved completeness of the
two direct translations. In the present paper we prove completeness of the two
indirect translations by showing that the corresponding illative systems are con-
servative over the two systems for the direct translations. In another version, DBB
(1997), we shall give a more direct completeness proof. These papers fulfill the
program of Church and Curry to base logic on a consistent system ofλ-terms
or combinators. Hitherto this program had failed because systems of ICL were
either too weak (to provide a sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes even
inconsistent).
1. Introduction
The theory of combinators and the lambda calculus are theories that succesfully
analyze the notion of effective computability. However, the original founders
of these subjects, Curry and Church, also had as aim to provide a basis for
logic (and thereby mathematics). Unfortunately, it was shown by Kleene and
Rosser that their systems were inconsistent. Curry and his school then started
a program of defining several systems of illative combinatory logic (ICL) of
varying strength. The goal was to find stronger and stronger systems which were
consistent and weaker and weaker systems which were inconsistent but strong
enough to interpret logic, hoping to end up with a consistent system in which
logic could be interpreted.
Following this methodology, Bunder introduced restrictions on the rules of
the illative constants so that first-order propositional and predicate calculus could
be interpreted in the resulting systems. In all his systems the usual derivation of
Curry’s paradox is blocked, but the consistency of the systems remains an open
question.
In BBD (1993) (Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, 1993) we introduced 4 sys-
tems of illative combinatory logic. We derived roughly the following soundness
result
∆ `L A ⇒ [∆] `C [A],
where L represents propositional or predicate logic and [−] one of two possible
translations of each system into an ICL system C. Of the interpretations one is
the propositions-as-types interpretation due to Curry, Howard and de Bruijn, the
other is a more direct interpretation.
We derived completeness results for the direct translations of propositional
and predicate calculus into 2 of the 4 systems of ICL. These, again roughly, took
the following form
[∆] `C [A] ⇒ ∆ `L A.
In the present paper we shall prove that also the two indirect translations are
complete.
These completeness results imply the consistency of the ICL’s involved.
2. Summary of results in preceding and present paper
This paper is a continuation of a preceding paper, BBD (1993), by the same
authors. We will refer to that paper most of the time simply as B; so for example
Proposition B2.11 means Proposition 2.11 in BBD (1993). As the present paper is
a continuation of that paper, we will not repeat all the definitions and results here
but will give only a very short summary. For an introduction into ICL-systems,
motivations, examples, propositions with proofs, and references we refer to BBD
(1993).
We had as aim in the preceding paper to prove
(i) ∆ `PROPϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr [[∆] 1r , Γ 1r (∆, ϕ) `I P [ϕ] 1r ];
(ii) ∆ `PRED ϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr [Γ 1,+r ,s , [∆] 1r , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I Ξ [ϕ] 1r ];
(iii) ∆ `PROPϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr ∃M [[∆] 2r , Γ 2r (∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 2r M ];
(iv) ∆ `PRED ϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr ∃M [Γ 2,+r ,s , [∆] 2r , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2r M ].
The proofs of soundness (⇒ )were easy. (cf. Propositions B2.11 and B2.14).
In Propositions B3.14 and B3.11 we proved completeness for the 2 direct trans-
lations [ ]1 : PROP→ I P and [ ]1 : PRED → I Ξ, ((i)⇐ and (ii)⇐), by
specialising tor = I i.e.
[∆] 1I , Γ
1
I (∆, ϕ) `I P [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ in B3.14
Γ 1,+I,s , [∆]
1
I , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I Ξ [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ in B3.11.
In the present paper we prove completeness for the 2 indirect translations [ ]2 :
PROP→ I F and [ ]2 : PRED→ I G, ((iii)⇐ and (iv)⇐), by specialising to
r = K. i.e.
[∆] 2K, Γ
2
K(∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 2KM ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ
Γ 2,+K,s , [∆]
2
K, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2KM ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
The completeness proof for the direct translation [ ]1 : PRED→ I Ξ ((ii)⇐)
was given in the preceding paper in the following way. We had to show
Γ ′ `I Ξ [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ,
whereΓ ′ = Γ 1,+I,s , [∆]
1
I , Γ (∆, ϕ). First we defined in B3.2 a setO in order to
analyze the termsM such thatΓ ′ `I Ξ M . We definedO = {M | ∃N∈O |
N =βη M } and it was clear thatΓ ′ ⊆ O. We showed in Proposition B3.10 that
O is an invariant (moduloβη-equality) for derivations inI Ξ :
Γ `I Ξ M , Γ ⊆ O ⇒ M ∈O.
Using this result we then proved in Proposition B3.11
Γ ′ `I Ξ [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
The completeness proof for [ ]1 : PROP→ I P ((i)⇐) was done in a similar
but easier way.
In the present paper we will prove completeness of [ ]2 : PROP→ I F and
[ ] 2 : PRED→ I G ((iii)⇐ and (iv)⇐), by specialising tor = K.
Completenes ofI F for PROP is relatively easy. We must show
[∆] 2K, Γ
2
K(∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 2KM ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ,
i.e. (by Proposition B2.15:K[ϕ] 1r = [ϕ]
2
K◦r )
[∆] 1I , Γ
1
I (∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ.
Let us denote the grammar for the completeness proof ofI P for PROP (defined
in B3.12) by O0 in order to distinguish it fromO above. We shall prove in
Proposition 3.3
Γ `I F M , Γ ⊆ O0 ⇒ Γ `I P M .
Then completenes ofI F for PROP for the second interpretation follows directly
from completenes ofI P for PROP for the first interpretation.
Completeness ofI G for PRED is a little bit more complicated. Again by
Proposition B2.15 (K[ϕ] 1r = [ϕ]
2
K◦r ), we see that we must prove
Γ 1,+I,s , [∆]
1
I , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
We define a grammar, denoted byOG to distinguish it fromO, and we will show
in Proposition 4.11 thatOG is closed under derivations inI G :
Γ `I G M , Γ ⊆ OG ⇒ M ∈OG.
The invariantOG is more complicated thanO of B3.2 and we cannot use it to
prove completeness directly in a way similar to the proof of completeness for
I Ξ relative to PRED by means ofO in B3.11. In fact we shall useOG in order
to show in Lemma 4.19 that in a proof ofΓ `I G M , whereΓ ⊆ O, all cut
formulas can be eliminated. From this we get in Proposition 4.23 conservativity
of I G over I Ξ :
Γ ⊆ O, M ∈O, Γ `I G M ⇒ Γ `I Ξ M
and then completeness ofI G for PRED is an immediate corollary of this propo-
sition and Proposition B3.11 (completeness ofI Ξ for PRED).
2.1. Remark.In the present paper we give the completeness proofs ofI F for
PROP andI G for PRED by specialising tor = K. One may wonder if the
proofs can be given for otherr , especially forr = I. This is indeed the case. In
Sect. 5 we will comment on that.
3. Completeness ofI F for PROP
We must show forϕ ∈ FPROP, ∆ ⊆ FPROP:
∀ closedr ∃M ∈Λ[[∆] 2r , Γ 2r (∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 2r M ] ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ.
It is sufficient to show
∃M ∈Λ[[∆] 2K, Γ 2K(∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 2KM ] ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ.
We have by Proposition B2.15 the following relation between the two interpre-
tations:
K[ϕ] 1r = [ϕ]
2
K◦r .
Hence we must prove
[∆] 1I , Γ
1
I (∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 1I ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ.
We omit I in the notation and we prove
[∆] 1, Γ 1(∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 1 ⇒ ∆ `PROPϕ. (∗)
(∗) could be proved in exactly the same way as Proposition B3.14 (Completeness
for I P relative to PROP), changing onlyI P in I F. The reason for this is the
following. In the proof of Proposition B2.7 we showed thatPe, Pi andPH follow
from Fe, Fi andFL by the substitutions ofKX for X andKY for Y . An inspection
of the proof of completeness forI P relative to PROP shows that everyX and
Y occurring in the proof in casesPe, Pi andPH have the formKX1 andKY1 and
therefore also a substitution in the opposite direction is possible.
We will give another proof and show that (*) is aconsequenceof Proposition
B3.14 by proving in Proposition 3.3 that we have
[∆] 1, Γ 1(∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 1 ⇒ [∆] 1, Γ 1(∆, ϕ) `I P [ϕ] 1.
3.1. Definition If R is any grammatical class in this paper then
R = {X | (∃Y) Y∈R ∧ X =βη Y}.
3.2. Definition (Grammar for derivable formulas forI F) We copy Definition
B3.12, adding the index0.
P0 = V0 | P0 ⊃ P0 ≡ Ξ(KP0)(KP0);
G0 = HP0 | P0 ⊃ G0 ≡ Ξ(KP0)(KG0);
O0 = G0 | P0.
Note that [∆]1, Γ 1(∆, ϕ) ⊆ O0.
3.3. PropositionI F is conservative overI P in the following sense
Γ `I F M & Γ ⊆ O0 ⇒ Γ `I P M & M ∈O0. (∗∗)
Proof. We rewrite the rules forI F in the following way:
Fe Γ ` ΞX(Y ◦ Z), Γ ` XV ⇒ Γ ` (Y ◦ Z)V ;
Fi Γ, Xx ` (Y ◦ Z)x, Γ ` LX, x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y , Z) ⇒ Γ ` ΞX(Y ◦ Z);
FL Γ, Xx ` LY , Γ ` LX, x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y) ⇒ Γ ` L(FXY).
The proof of (**) is by induction on the proof ofΓ `I F M .
CaseFe. Γ `I F M is Γ `I F (Y ◦ Z)V as consequence of
Γ `I F ΞX(Y ◦ Z), Γ `I F XV .
By the induction hypothesis one has
Γ `I P ΞX(Y ◦ Z), Γ `I P XV ,
ΞX(Y ◦ Z) = Ξ(Kp)(KO), XV = p,
wherep∈P0 andO∈O0. By rule Pe we haveΓ `I P O, whereO = (Y ◦ Z)V =
M .
CaseFi . Γ `I F M is Γ `I F ΞX(Y ◦ Z) as consequence of
Γ `I F LX, Γ, Xx `I F (Y ◦ Z)x with x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y , Z).
By the IH we have
Γ `I P LX, X = Kp, Γ, p `I P (Y ◦ Z)x
and (Y◦ Z)x = O∈O0. Now x 6∈FV(Γ, p), so x 6∈FV(O) by Proposition B3.10,
henceY ◦ Z = KO. Therefore by rulePi we get
Γ `I P p ⊃ O
andp ⊃ O = Ξ(Kp)(KO) = ΞX(Y ◦ Z) = M .
CaseFL. Γ `I F M is Γ `I F L(FXY) as consequence of
Γ `I F LX, Γ, Xx `I F L(Y) with x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y).
By the IH one has
Γ `I P LX, X = Kp, Γ, p `I P L(Y), Y = Kp1.
Hence by rulePH Γ `I P H(p ⊃ p1). Now H(p ⊃ p1) = L(K(p ⊃ p1)) =
L(F(Kp)(Kp1)) = L(FXY). So Γ `I P M . 
4. Completeness ofI G for PRED
We will show for ϕ ∈ FPRED, ∆ ⊆ FPRED :
∀ closedr [ Γ 2,+r ,s , [∆] 2r , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2r M someM ] ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
It is sufficient to show
Γ 2,+K,s , [∆]
2
K, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2KM ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ,
i.e. (by Proposition B2.15:K[ϕ] 1r = [ϕ]
2
K◦r )
Γ 1,+s , [∆]
1, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 1 ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
HereΓ 1,+s , [∆]





The proof is again in several steps. First we define in 4.2 aninvariant OG
(modulo βη-equality) for derivations inI G. Using this invariant we show in
Lemma 4.19 that in a proof ofΓ 1,+s , [∆]
1, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G N all cuts can be elim-
inated. From this we get in Proposition 4.23
Γ 1,+s , [∆]
1, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G N ⇒ Γ 1,+s , [∆] 1, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I Ξ N
and then completeness ofI G for PRED is an immediate corollary of this propo-
sition and Proposition B3.11. Instead of`I G we shall mostly writè .
Now first we repeat Definition B3.2, of the invariantO for derivations in
I Ξ for the manysorted structure of our example, in order to contrast it with the
one for derivable statements inI G of Definition 4.2 and also because we need
it in the sequel. Instead ofxi , Vi andTi we shall writexAi , V Ai andT Ai .
4.1. Definition (Grammar for derivable statements inI Ξ)
T = T A1 | T A2;
T A1 = V A1 | a | f T A1 | gT A1T A2;
T A2 = V A2;
P = PT A1 | ΞAi (λxAi .P) | Ξ(KP)(KP);
G = LAi | Ai T Ai | ΞAi (λxAi .G) | Ξ(KP)(KG) | L(KP);
O = G | P.
Now we will define the invariantOG for derivable statements inI G. OG is
more complicated then the grammarO for I Ξ for several reasons:
Write Γ ′ for Γ 1,+s , [∆]
1, Γ (∆, ϕ). If Γ ′ ` LX in systemI Ξ then X = Ai
or X = Kp with p∈P. But if Γ ′ ` LX in systemI G then we can have for
exampleX = FA1A2 or evenX = F(Kp)A2. Therefore we define an extension
LG of the set of sorts{A1, A2} containing theseX ′s. We need for eachl ∈LG
a set of variablesV lG , similar to the setsV
A1 andV A2. If we took a different
set of variables for eachl ∈LG, then the substitution lemma 4.5, that is needed
in the proof of Proposition 4.11, would not hold. Therefore we define for each
l ∈LG the skeleton sk(l), such thatsk(Kp) is the same for allp∈PG and we
defineV l1G = V
l2
G iff sk(l1) = sk(l2).
The setsT lG will contain λ−abstractions: ifl = Fl1l2 and t l2∈T l2G then
λxl1.t l2∈T lG . This may seem a little bit strange, but in fact it is very nat-
ural. For example we havè FA1A1(λxA1.xA1) by rule Fi . Hence λxA1.xA1
should be inT FA1A1G . Moreover in the proof of Lemma 4.9 we really need
that λxl1.t l2∈T Fl1l2G .
Finally PG, GG andOG are very similar toP, G andO, except that besides
Ξ(Kp)(KO)∈OG we now also haveΞ(Kp)(λxKp.O)∈OG, wherexKp may occur
free in O.
4.2. Definition (Invariant OG for derivable statements inI G) (i) Λs(Ξ, L) is,
as in Definition B2.12,Λ(Ξ, L) extended by the extra constants A1, 2, P, f , g, a
associated with the signature s of the manysorted structure of our example.
(ii) Now we will define simultaneously setsQG and LG of sorts (extensions
of the set{A1, A2}), for each l∈LG the skeleton sk(l ), a set of variablesV lG and
a set of termsT lG , setsPG, GG andOG.
Definition ofQG andLG.
QG = A1 | A2 | Gl (λxl .q) (l ∈LG, xl ∈V lG , q∈QG);
LG = QG ∪ KPG.
Definition of sk(l ).
sk(Ai ) = Ai ;
sk(Kp) = K(PxA11 ) (i.e. sk(Kp) is independent ofp);
sk(Gl (λxl .q)) = G(sk(l ))(λxl .sk(q)).
Definition ofV lG .
We assume that for each skeletonsk(l ) there is a different set of variables
V
sk(l )
G = {xsk(l ), xsk(l )1 , xsk(l )2 , . . . , ysk(l ), ysk(l )1 , ysk(l )2 , . . .}
and for eachl ∈ LG we define
V lG = V
sk(l )
G , x
l = xsk(l ), xli = x
sk(l )
i , y
l = ysk(l ), yli = y
sk(l )
i .
Definition ofT lG .
T lG = a | V lG | T Fl1lG T l1G , if l ≡ A1;
T lG = V
l
G | T Fl1lG T l1G , if l ≡ A2;
T lG = f | V lG | T Fl1lG T l1G | λxA1.T A1G , if l ≡ FA1A1;
T lG = g | V lG | T Fl1lG T l1G | λxA1.T FA2A1G , if l ≡ FA1(FA2A1);
T lG = V
l




G | λxl2.T l3G , if l ≡ Gl2(λxl2.l3),
l 6∈{FA1A1, FA1(FA2A1)};
T lG = Λ
s(Ξ, L), if l ≡ Kp.
Definition ofPG, GG andOG.
PG = PT
A1
G | Ξl (λxl .PG);
GG = LLG | Ai T AiG | Ξl (λxl .GG);
OG = PG | GG.
(iii) Notation.
q, q1, q2, q
′, . . . denote elements ofQG;
l , l1, l2, l
′, . . . denote elements ofLG;
p, p1, p2, p
′, . . . denote elements ofPG.
4.3. Remarks.(i) Γ 1,+s , [∆]
1, Γ (∆, ϕ) ⊆ O ⊆ OG.
(ii) If FV(q ) = ∅ then Gl (λxl .q) =β Flq . In that case we will denote
Gl (λxl .q) usually byFlq . In fact we did that already in the above definition.
(iii) The grammar in the definition is not context-free and this causes some
inaccuracies in the notation. In the definition ofPG (and similarly at some other
places) instead ofΞl (λxl .PG) we should writeΞLG(λxLG .PG), but then we
do not know that these twoLG ’s represent thesame l∈LG. (We may not have
Ξl1(λxl2.PG).)









2 wherel = l
′[x l1 := t l12 ], but that
does not make a difference because we have forl ∈LG
T




as follows easily from
V





4.4. Lemma. l1, l2∈LG ⇒ Gl1(λxl1.l2)∈LG.
Proof. It is clear if l2∈QG. Now let l2 = Kp. Then
Gl1(λxl1.l2) = λz.Ξl1(S(λxl1.Kp)z) = λz.Ξl1(λxl1.p) = K(Ξl1(λxl1.p))∈KPG. 
4.5. Lemma. Let W = QG, LG, T lG , PG, GG, or OG and let w∈W , xl1
∈V l1G , t l1∈T l1G , then
w[x l1 := t l1]∈W ,
moreover ifW = LG then
sk(w[x l1 := t l1]) = sk(w)
and hence
V




Proof. By induction on the structure ofw. Instead ofxl1 and t l1 we shall write
x and t .
Casew∈QG.
w = Ai . This is trivially ok.
w = Gl2(λyl2.q). Thenw[x := t ] = G(l2[x := t ])(λyl2.q[x := t ]) =
= G(l2[x := t ])(λyl2[x :=t] .q[x := t ])
(by the second part of the IH forl2) and this is inQG by
the first part of the IH forl2 andq. The second part of the
IH for l2 andq yields sk(w[x := t ]) = sk(w).
Casew∈LG.
This follows directly from the casesw∈QG, w∈PG.
Casew = t l ∈T lG .
l = A1. Now w = x
A1






2 . All these cases are easy.
l = A2. Easy.







l2.tq1 , f or g. Easy again.
l = Kp. Thenw[x := t ]∈Λ = T KpG .
Casew∈PG.
w = PtA11 . Thenw[x := t ] = P(t
A1
1 [x := t ]).
w = Ξl2(λyl2.p). Then w[x := t ] = Ξ(l2[x := t ])(λyl2.p[x := t ]) =
= Ξ(l2[x := t ])(λyl2[x :=t] .p[x := t ]).
Casew∈GG. Similarly. 
4.6. Lemma.Let cX1 . . . Xn =βη M for some constant c and some M∈OG. Then
n∈{1,2} and M ≡ cY1 . . . Yn with Yi =βη Xi .
Proof. By Church-Rosser forβη-reduction. 
4.7. Lemma. Let q∈QG p∈PG, M∈Λs(Ξ, L) and letσ substitute variables for
variables. Then qM6=βη pσ.
Proof. By an easy induction onq, using Church-Rosser. 
In the definition ofGG one of the clauses isAi T
Ai
G where one might expect
the more general clauseqT qG . But Ai T
Ai
G is sufficient as follows from the next
lemma.
4.8. Lemma.
qtq∈GG for each q∈QG.
Proof. By induction on the structure ofq. It is clear if q = A1 or A2.
So let q = Gl1(λxl1.q1). Then qtq = Gl1(λxl1.q1)tq = Ξl1(S(λxl1.q1)tq) =
Ξl1(λxl1.q1(tqxl1)). Now tq ∈ T qG = T Gl1(λx
l1 .q1)
G andx
l1∈T l1G hencetqxl1∈T q1G .
So by the induction hypothesis one hasq1(tqxl1)∈GG. HenceΞl1(λxl1.q1(tqxl1))
∈GG. 
4.9. Lemma.
lV ∈OG ⇒ V ∈T lG .
Proof. By induction on the structure ofl . It is clear if l = A1, A2 or Kp. So let
l = Gl1(λxl1.q). ThenlV = Ξl1(λxl1.q(V xl1)). Soq(V xl1)∈OG and hence by the
induction hypothesis we haveV xl1 = tq∈T qG . So V = λxl1.tq∈T lG . 
4.10. Remark.Clearly (Kp)tKp = p∈PG, hence combining Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9
we get
lV ∈OG ⇔ V ∈T lG .
Now we will prove Γ ` M , Γ ⊆ OG ⇒ M ∈OG. The proof is different
from the proof of Proposition B3.10, because we do not have
Γ ` M , Γ ⊆ OG & u 6∈βηFV(Γ ) ⇒ u 6∈βηFV(M ).
This is shown by the following example
F(Kp)A1x, p ` A1(xu).
In fact this is the reason that in the grammarOG we have elementsΞ(Kp)(λxKp.O)
instead of the simpler elementsΞ(Kp)(KO).
4.11. Proposition.In I G we have
Γ ` M , Γ ⊆ OG ⇒ M ∈OG.
Proof. By induction on the derivation ofΓ ` M . We only consider the three
specific rulesΞe, Ξi and GL. ( The two general rules are easy andGe, Gi are
equivalent toΞe, Ξi . )
CaseΞe. Γ ` M is Γ ` YV as direct consequence ofΓ ` ΞXY, Γ ` XV .
By the IH one has ΞXY∈OG, XV∈OG. From ΞXY∈OG it follows that X =
l , Y = λxl .O whereO∈OG. Now XV = lV ∈OG, henceV = t l ∈T lG by Lemma
4.9. M = (λxl .O)t l = O[x l := t l ]∈OG by Lemma 4.5.
CaseΞi . Γ ` M is Γ ` ΞXY as direct consequence of
Γ ` LX, Γ, Xx ` Yx with x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y).
By the IH one hasLX∈OG, henceX = l ∈LG. Now x is any variable, so we
may assume thatx = xl ∈V lG . Then lx∈OG by Lemma 4.8, hence by the IH we
haveYx∈OG. Let Yx = O∈OG. ThenM = Ξl (λxl .O)∈OG.
CaseGL. Γ ` M is Γ ` L(GXY) as direct consequence of
Γ ` LX, Γ, Xx ` L(Yx) with x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y).
By the IH one has LX∈OG, henceX = l ∈LG. Again we may assume that
x = xl ∈V lG . Then lx∈OG, hence by the IH we haveL(Yx)∈OG. So Yx =
l1∈LG. GXY = Gl (λxl .l1))∈LG by Lemma 4.4. HenceL(GXY)∈GG ⊆ OG. 
The invariantOG is more complicated thanO and we cannot prove complete-
ness directly using this grammar, as in in B3.11 forI Ξ relative to PRED. In fact
we will useOG in order to show in 4.12-4.21 that in each proofΓ `I G M , where
Γ ⊆ OG, all cut formulas can be eliminated. From this we get in Proposition
4.23 conservativity ofI G over I Ξ
Γ ⊆ O, M ∈O, Γ `I G M ⇒ Γ `I Ξ M
and then completeness ofI G for PRED is an immediate corollary of this propo-
sition and Proposition B3.11.
Cut elimination
First we define theΞ−length LΞ(O) for O∈OG ( and LΞ(l ) for l ∈LG ) and
state some lemma’s, without the (trivial) proofs.
4.12. Definition. (Ξ−lengthLΞ)
LΞ(Pt
A1) = LΞ(Ll ) = LΞ(Ai t
Ai ) = 0, LΞ(Ξl (λx
l .O)) = 1 + LΞ(l ) + LΞ(O),
LΞ(Ai ) = 0, LΞ(Gl (λx
l .q)) = 1 + LΞ(l ) + LΞ(q), LΞ(Kp) = LΞ(p).
4.13. Lemma.(i) X , Y∈LG ∪ OG, X → βη Y ⇒ LΞ(X) = LΞ(Y).
(ii) X , Y∈LG ∪ OG, X =βη Y ⇒ LΞ(X) = LΞ(Y).
4.14. Definition. Let M∈OG, M =βη O. Then LΞ(M ) = LΞ(O).
4.15. Lemma.LΞ(l t l ) = LΞ(l ).
4.16. Lemma.X∈LG ∪ OG, t l ∈T lG ⇒ LΞ(X[x l := t l ]) = LΞ(X).
4.17. Lemma.
ΞXY∈OG, XV∈OG ⇒ LΞ(XV) < LΞ(ΞXY) & LΞ(YV) < LΞ(ΞXY).
Proof. ΞXY = Ξl (λxl .O) andV ∈T lG . Now use Lemma’s 4.15 and 4.16.
4.18. Definition. A cut elimination is a proof reduction of the following form
ΞXY is called the cut formula.
4.19. Lemma.In a proof ofΓ `I G M ( or Γ `I Ξ M ), whereΓ ⊆ OG, all cut
formulas can be eliminated by the above proof reduction.
Proof. By induction on the maximalΞ−length of cut formulas in the proof of
Γ `I G M . Consider a first cut in the proof with a cut formulaΞXY of maximal
Ξ−length. Eliminate this cut. Now new cut formulas may have been introduced
at XV and YV, however by Lemma 4.17 these have shorterΞ−length. In the
same way all other cut formulas of maximalΞ−length can be eliminated and so
by the induction hypothesis all cut formulas can be eliminated. 
4.20. Remark.Because of Lemma 4.13, the above can easily be generalised to
allow βη−equality steps (Eq-steps) as follows.
4.21. Remark.Similarly we can define cut elimination forI P as a proof reduc-
tion of the following form.
This is in fact a special case of Definition 4.18. ( SubstituteKX for X and
KY for Y in Definition 4.18.) Also in a proof ofΓ `I P M whereΓ ⊆ OG all
cut formulas can be eliminated.
Now we need only one more lemma to derive conservativity ofI G over
I Ξ in Proposition 4.23.
4.22. Lemma.LetΓ ⊆ O and letΓ `I G N be a cut free proof. If the last applied
rule in the proof is not theΞi−rule, nor theGL−rule (modulo theβη−rule), then
N∈O.
Proof. The proof is by induction onΓ ` N . The two general cases are easy, so
we only consider
CaseΞe. Γ ` N is Γ ` YV as direct consequence ofΓ ` ΞXY, Γ ` XV .
By the induction hypothesis forΓ ` ΞXY we haveΞXY∈O. We distinguish
two subcases
Subcasea). ΞXY = ΞAi (λxAi .O) with O∈O. The induction hypothesis forΓ `
Ai V yields Ai V ∈O and henceV ∈T Ai . So N = YV = O[x Ai := V ]∈O.
Subcaseb). ΞXY = Ξ(Kp)(KO) with O∈O. Now YV = O∈O. 
4.23. Proposition.I G is conservative overI Ξ in the following sense
Γ ⊆ O, M ∈O, Γ `I G M ⇒ Γ `I Ξ M .
Proof. By induction on the derivation ofΓ `I G M . We may assume that the
proof is cut free. Again we only consider the three specific rulesΞe, Ξi andGL.
CaseΞe. Γ `I G M is Γ `I G YV as direct consequence of
Γ `I G ΞXY, Γ `I G XV .
ΞXY∈O by Lemma 4.22, so by the IH we haveΓ `I Ξ ΞXY. Now X = Ai or
X = Kp1, so alsoXV∈O (use Lemma 4.22 for the case:X = Ai ). Again by the
IH we getΓ `I Ξ XV . So Γ `I Ξ YV by rule Ξe.
CaseΞi . Γ `I G M is Γ `I G ΞXY as direct consequence of
Γ `I G LX, Γ, Xx `I G Yx with x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y).
ΞXY∈O so X = Ai or X = Kp1 and Yx = O∈O. So LX∈O, hence we have by
the IH Γ `I Ξ LX. Now Γ, Xx ⊆ O, Yx∈O, so Γ, Xx `I Ξ Yx by the IH. Hence
Γ `I Ξ ΞXY.
CaseGL. Γ `I G M is Γ `I G L(GXY) as direct consequence of
Γ `I G LX, Γ, Xx `I G L(Yx) with x 6∈FV(Γ, X, Y).
L(GXY)∈O so GXY = Kp, wherep = ΞAi (λxAi .p2) or p = Ξ(Kp1)(Kp2) with
p1, p2∈P. SinceLX∈O, we have by the IH Γ `I Ξ LX.
We may assumex = xAi . Now (Yx)(zx) = p2. Also L(Yx)∈OG. So Yx∈LG. We
can not haveYx∈QG by Lemma 4.7. SoYx = Kp3 with p3∈PG. p2 = (Yx)(zx) =
p3. So Yx = Kp2. HenceL(Yx) = Hp2∈O and the IH yields Γ, Xx `I Ξ Hp2.
If p = ΞAi (λxAi .p2) then we haveΓ, Xx `I Ξ H((λxAi .p2)xAi ). So by ruleΞH
we get Γ `I Ξ H(ΞAi (λxAi .p2)), i.e. Γ `I Ξ L(GXY). If p = Ξ(Kp1)(Kp2)
thenΓ, p1 `I Ξ Hp2 wherex 6∈FV(Γ, p1), sox 6∈FV(p2) by Proposition B3.10. So
Γ, (Kp1)x `I Ξ H((Kp2)x) wherex 6∈FV(Kp2), and therefore by ruleΞH we get
Γ `I Ξ H(Ξ(Kp1)(Kp2)), i.e. Γ `I Ξ L(GXY). 
4.24. Proposition.(Completeness ofI G for PRED)
Γ 1,+s , [∆]
1, Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 1 ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
Proof. This follows directly from the preceding proposition and Proposition
B3.11. 
5. Conclusions and remarks
In BBD (1993) and in this paper we proved soundness and completeness for
the direct and indirect interpretations of propositional and predicate calculus into
illative systems:
(i) ∆ `PROPϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr [[∆] 1r , Γ 1r (∆, ϕ) `I P [ϕ] 1r ];
(ii) ∆ `PRED ϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr [Γ 1,+r ,s , [∆] 1r , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I Ξ [ϕ] 1r ];
(iii) ∆ `PROPϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr ∃M [[∆] 2r , Γ 2r (∆, ϕ) `I F [ϕ] 2r M ];
(iv) ∆ `PRED ϕ ⇔ ∀ closedr ∃M [Γ 2,+r ,s , [∆] 2r , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2r M ].
The proofs of soundness (⇒ ) were simple for all 4 cases. The 2 completeness
proofs for the first interpretation [ ]1 where given in BBD (1993) by specialising
to r = I whereas in the 2 completeness proofs for the second interpretation [ ]2
in the present paper we specialised tor = K. One may wonder if these proofs
could also be given by specialising tor = I. This is indeed the case as is shown
in DBB (1997).
Let us first compare the proof of completeness ofI G for PRED in DBB
(1997) with that in the present paper. In DBB (1997) we had to show
Γ 2,+I,s , [∆]
2
I , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2I M ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ.
This proof could not be reduced to a completeness proof for the first interpretation
[ ] 1. Hence the completeness could not follow from a conservativity result of
I G overI Ξ like in Proposition 4.23. We defined an invariantOG (moduloβη-
equality) for derivations inI G. This invariant was similar toOG of the present
paper, but there were essential differences. For example in the present paper we
can havel ≡ K(PtA1) with T lG = Λs(Ξ, L), contrasted withl ≡ (PtA1) and




G in DBB (1997). Using this invariant we showed,
like in Lemma 4.19, that in a proof ofΓ 2,+I,s , [∆]
2
I , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G N all cuts can
be eliminated. Then we defined a second invariantO1 similar to O in B3.2 and
using this invariant we proved directly completeness ofI G for PRED
Γ 2,+I,s , [∆]
2
I , Γ (∆, ϕ) `I G [ϕ] 2I M ⇒ ∆ `PRED ϕ
in a way similar to the proof of completeness of [ ]1 : PRED→ I Ξ in B3.2 -
B3.11. So we didn’t have the conservativity result forI G over I Ξ
Γ ⊆ O, M ∈O, Γ `I G M ⇒ Γ `I Ξ M
of Proposition 4.23.
Also the completeness proof ofI F for PROP was proved in DBB (1997)
directly i.e. without reducing it to a completeness proof for the first interpretation.
Also in that case we didn’t have the conservativity result forI F over I P
Γ `I F M & Γ ⊆ O0 ⇒ Γ `I P M & M ∈O0
of Proposition 3.3.
5.1. Remark.In B4.1 we stated that it is possible to work with variants of the
systemsI P, I Ξ, I F andI G based onβ-conversion only. This still holds.
It might seem that in the proof of 4.9 we used theη−axiom, but that is not
the case, because by Definition 4.2 not onlyftA1∈T A1G , but alsof ∈T FA1A1G and
similarly g∈T FA1(FA2A1)G .
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